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Abstract: This study explores the successful design and global implementation of
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) in a Multi-national Corporation (MNC). It
examines the notion of dispersed change agency and investigates the part played
by change teams focussing on the roles, interactions and competencies of change
agents tasked with managing ERP change. A processual research methodology
was used in the collection of of data through participant observation, face-to-face
interviews, documentary evidence and telephone interviews. This article draws
on data collected as part of the Paris case study and examines how their ERP
change strategy was designed and globally implemented in SUND. A key finding
centres on questioning conventional notions of leadership in highlighting the
importance of dispersed change agency and clusters of competencies in
facilitating the improvisation of strategies during processes of change.
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Introduction
Much of the change management literature highlights the difficulties of managing largescale change (Andriopoulos and Dawson, 2009). Beer and Nohria (1998) for example,
point out how about 70 percent of all major change initiatives fail. In the case of ERP,
Appleton (1997) estimates that half of all implementation efforts fail to meet their
objectives, with 40 percent being partially implemented, and 20 to 50 percent of
initiatives shelved (see also, Martin, 1998). Likewise, Caruso (2007) refers to failure
rates of 51 percent, and how 30 percent of ERP projects far exceed their budget and
completion dates. Attention is typically given to the roles and activities of particular
types of change agents (Tichy, 1975) or the range of activities associated with
champions of change – the charismatic change leader (Gilley, 2005). However,
Caldwell (2005) argues that whilst managing change is often a team process (see Kotter,
1996) there is a paucity of empirical research in this area (Cummings and Worley, 1997;
Mayon-White, 1993; West, 1990). This article thereby seeks to address some of these
concerns through reporting on a longitudinal processual analysis of ERP change in a
multi-national corporation (which for reasons of anonymity are henceforth referred to as
SUND).
Implementing Large-Scale Change and the Role of Internal Change Agents
Large Multi-National Corporations (MNC) are perceived as facing regular problems
which relate to their complex organisational structures, cultural diversity,
geographically dispersed operations and increasing need to respond to global
competition. On this count, Drucker (1999) refers to five external certainties that
influence organisational strategy. These comprise: the collapsing birth-rate; shifts in
disposable income; different perspectives on performance, growth in global
competitiveness; and the growing incongruence between economic globalisation and

political splintering. Internal triggers to change are also acknowledged and these are
identified as: technology; people; core business; administrative structures and the
culture and history of on organization (Dawson, 2003: 15-26). It is argued that as the
internal and external environments become more uncertain, effective strategic decisionmaking becomes increasingly critical. Kanter (1983) suggests that corporations that
succeed in such times are those that have the ability to be masters of change by creating
a climate that encourages ‘the introduction of new procedures and new possibilities,
encouraging anticipation of and response to external pressures’ (Kanter, 1983: 65).
Many studies still set out to produce deterministic universal prescriptions for successful
change management based on an evaluation of a limited set of situational variables (see
for example Dunphy and Stace, 1993). In contrast empirical evidence indicates that
implementation of change is seldom simplistic (Alvesson and Sveningsson, 2008;
Pettigrew et al., 1992), and that little consideration has been given to organisational
history, the content of the change, contextual complexity, the dynamic process of
change and the diverse vested interests influencing change strategy (Pettigrew, 1985;
Dawson, 1994). As such, there is a need for more in-depth studies on organisational
change that can examine these processes overtime, and to consider how organisations
may develop strategies to proactively anticipate, harness and activate ongoing change.
It is argued here, that an analysis of the roles of change teams will further contribute to
our knowledge of how to manage processes of organisational change and that this can
best be accomplished through a longitudinal processual analysis of a large-scale change
programme.
In considering transformational change in a MNC we investigate how the concerted
actions of change teams enable complex and rapid ERP change. Some authors highlight
how limited attention has focused on dispersed change agency (Buchanan et al., 2007)
and the concerted actions of employees to enable transformational change (Gronn,
2002). This research responds to the challenge identified by Pettigrew (2001), Buchanan
(2003) and Caldwell (2003), to gain insight into the complex dynamics of organisational
change processes by focusing on the roles of internal change agents operating in teams.
The literature considers the range of parties or change agents participating in these
processes (Ottaway, 1983; Buchanan and Badham, 2008; Judson, 1991; Galpin, 1996).
Despite this, little attention has been given to a more contextual and temporal mapping
of the roles, relationships and activities of internal change agents (Balogun, et al, 2005;
Saka, 2003; Hartley et al., 1997).
Change agents have been broadly defined by Caldwell (2003:140) as: ‘The individuals
or teams that are going to initiate, lead, direct or take direct responsibility for making
change happen’. A distinction is drawn between internal change agents or employees
who are tasked formally with design and implementation of change (French and Bell,
1995) and employees who undertake, and integrate change agent roles into their jobs
but are not formally acknowledged as change agents. Surprisingly, the literature offers
limited reference to internal change agents and highlights that they may be important
assets for any organisation ‘in their capacity to disseminate personal learning and
promote organisational change’ (Hartley et al., 1997:365).
In this paper, our attention is on formal change agency, although the roles and actions of
other employees are accommodated in data analysis of the change process. Saka (2003)
points to how further empirical studies on internal change agents roles provide an

opportunity to uncover insights into overcoming the barriers to managing organisational
change. It also enables us to explore the relationship between the actions of key actors,
and the development or improvisation of organisational strategy and structures.
Strategic Change and ERP in an MNC: The Case of SUND
The context for the study is SUND, a Multi National Corporation (MNC) and a leading
global provider of technology, project management and information solutions to the
international petroleum industry. SUND provides a wide range of products and services
from well formation and evaluation through to directional drilling of wells, well
cementing and stimulation, well completions and productivity to oil service consulting,
software development, information management and IT infrastructure services that
support core oil and gas industry operational processes. SUND employs 87,000 people
drawn from over 140 nationalities and located in approximately 80 countries. It
manages its businesses through 33 Oilfield Services regions which are grouped into four
geographic regions, comprising: North America, Latin America, Europe, CIS and
Africa, and Middle East and Asia
Examination of company strategy documents indicated that integration of information
technology (IT) business systems was a long term key objective of the corporation.
Competitors had already completed integration of business systems and it was seen as a
means for this corporation to improve the quality and timeliness of decision-making and
hence improve competitiveness. Criticality for ERP implementation was emphasised, as
a prior attempt at integrating IT business systems, four years earlier, into one software
application was perceived to have failed, incurring huge costs to the organisation (the
extent of these costs was not divulged). Access to SUND enabled us a valuable
research opportunity to examine over time the customisation and global implementation
of Lawson’s ERP software, which would have major implications for all SUND
business operations.
Data collection was conducted over a twenty month period (from January 2003 until
August 2004) and in analysing the data particular attention has been given to the roles
and competencies of change agents working within teams. The main study covered
three subsidiary sites located in Norway, Russia and the UK; here however, we draw on
data collected from SUND headquarters in Paris. The Paris headquarters of SUND is
located in a modern campus of office buildings in central Paris. Participant observation
revealed that the project team leading this ERP change process consisted of
approximately one hundred staff drawn from across the MNC. The project team were
spread over two floors of one modern building, within a campus of SUND office
buildings, and worked in an open plan office environment. Groups of up to four were
positioned together without any form of partition separating the desks. Project team
member’s interactions were characterised as very informal as there were few formal
meetings and project team members met to solve problems on an ad hoc basis.
Employees were extremely mobile in this environment as they all used wireless enabled
laptop computers. Over the course of data collection, subsidiary support team staff
visited the Paris headquarters to attend training sessions and to test the ERP that had
been customised to meet their subsidiary requirements. Most interaction between the
project team and subsidiary change teams took place in a conference room located next
to the main reception desk.

The Paris data set was used to analyse SUND’s global ERP implementation strategy
with particular attention being given to the roles, practices and competencies of two
dispersed change teams: the centralised project team and the post deployment team,
formally tasked with ERP change. From our analysis of these change teams we identify
a typology of roles and competencies from which we discuss the optimum conditions
for interaction in the development of effective change agency. In particular, we
emphasise how these change teams applied complementary methods and employed
specific political tactics to enable improvisation of both the ERP software and
implementation strategy that ultimately led to the rapid and successful change in what is
a geographically dispersed and culturally diverse organisation.
Strategies for Change: Software Development and Implementation
The ERP change strategy comprised two interwoven strategies: one for ERP software
development and another for ERP implementation. Project team Members reported that
these strategies involved, firstly design of the broad parameters of the ERP software and
secondly, the global implementation and then further development of the ERP software.
It was generally accepted by all project team members that the complexity, diversity,
geographical distribution of business operations, together with the disruptive nature of
the ERP change strategy dictated that decisions regarding choice of software and its
parameters and implementation could only successfully emerge by establishing
practices to access user software needs. As such, the Paris project team and post
deployment team recognised the importance of working with locally based subsidiary
teams to effect improvisation in the development of the ERP software.
Early software design strategy was formulated by the steering group, change champion
and project team members. The nature or substance of the organisational change process
dictated that a priority was the technical mapping of existing business processes, so as
to define the parameters and requirements for the new ERP software. The selection of
the Lawson software allowed for flexibility and standardisation as the software needed
to strike a balance between accommodating a huge range of diverse business processes,
while also providing continuity and ease of use.
Project team roles initially focused on a ‘gap’ analysis between the Lawson business
processes and those of SUND, thereby indicating where the Lawson software required
customisation. The template of mapped business processes produced for a prior failed
ERP software (SAP) reduced the need for employee participation during the initial
design. Staff reported that they were aware of this failed implementation and indicated
that they were pessimistic of success with this new attempt at implementation. For this
reason, project team members were careful not to oversell the benefits of the software
and decided that they would not communicate a vision for this ERP process to
employees (this was a deliberate strategy). Project team members identified that this
fast, driven approach to implementation was supported by the organisational culture in
SUND, as it was an accepted way of operating in this organisation.
The devolved nature of the organisational structure, the diversity of business processes,
the autonomous power of the regions and their geographical distribution, meant that a
staged software development and implementation rollout was required. This followed a
pattern of regional sequential implementation commencing with pilots in Norway and
Nigeria after which global implementation proceeded in Europe 1, Europe 2, Africa,
Latin America, Middle East 1, Middle East 2 and finally Canada and the USA.

The Central Paris Project Team
The central Paris project team had approximately 102 members consisting of internal
employees and external consultants (around 30 per cent), with a core team that managed
the overall strategy and two further sub-teams that took responsibility for software
development and change management issues. Communication within the project team
was mainly informal, few formal meetings were held. The weekly meeting of the entire
project team was generally regarded as a means of political power posturing within the
team. An example of this is indicated in the following core team member’s comment:
We have a weekly team meeting on Wednesday where they’re meant to give us
the latest information on whatever. To be honest, I rarely go to it. When I do go to
it, I don’t learn anything new or I hear a lot of information that I know is
inaccurate. I feel that sometimes it’s point-scoring on different groups.
Project team members generally endorsed the informal nature of team communication.
They perceived this as a function of the close proximity of the team within an open plan
office arrangement over two floors of the corporate headquarters, and that they were
familiar with each other. Many of the project team reported that they had worked,
socialised or communicated with each other prior to the project. The following
comments from project core team members and change management team members
support this view:
We know people in each of the core functions so that if an issue crops up within
the field we know the person to consult. There is very little formal interaction
within the team. – Its very informal. So when the training team goes out to the
location and he or she identifies an issue or encounters a query about my
expertise, then he or she will direct it to me (core team member).
In contrast, project team communication between the subsidiaries was dominated by the
use of e-mails and telephone conferencing. Direct contact prior to implementation was
limited by presentations and meetings with senior managers and the designated change
agents from the subsidiary. Such contact took place in the subsidiary and in the Paris
headquarters. Although during the implementation phases project team change agents
increased their level of face-to-face contact by supporting the trainers and subsidiary
staff members by visits to the subsidiaries, this was limited. Consequently, most
relationships with the project team and the subsidiary were conducted via two mediums:
an electronic ticketing system which allocated problems raised in the subsidiary to the
appropriate project team member and e-mails from subsidiary internal change agents.
The core team: roles and activities
During the early stages of implementation emphasis was placed on the technical
business process mapping roles, software development and problem solving. Activities
within their individual roles related to the specific business processes they controlled,
while responsibilities for the motivational aspects of the ERP change process were
allocated to the change management team. Due to the previous failure of SAP, the core
team were keen not to over-promote the change. As one core member noted:
At the beginning we formed a communications committee with the project
manager and all the functional leads. In these meetings we had to convey a very

clear message and hammer out what we would say about different subjects…..We
are very weary of over selling or banging a drum. We are more about saying
where we are going and the reasons why, but not making claims.
During implementation core team project team staff were critical of the lack of
engagement of subsidiary staff and they were forthright in providing examples of how
employees used negative comments and directly refused to comply with new working
arrangements. Examples of this behaviour included subsidiary staff ignoring e-mail
requests and failing to organise themselves. As such, operations staff located in the
subsidiaries were generally perceived as being uncommitted to the ERP change process.
A core team member referred to how the ERP strategy is: ‘driven by the financial entity
and it is perceived by the field that this is a financial project’. This reflected a cultural
and structural distinction between financial and operational departments, exemplified by
differences in their use of language and the separate management structures. This was
supported in the following remark:
We have very clear financial rules. That is not exactly the case in operations…..
You cannot have a new business system that functions without enforcing the
rules. That’s one of the reasons for resistance (core team).
Evidence also suggested that lack of engagement and ownership from operations staff
created resistance which occurred due to their limited understanding of the benefits of
the new software. They perceived the ERP process as inflicting extra work. For them, it
was a financial process so: ‘there’s nothing for him because he doesn’t care, what he
cares about is maintaining his inventory’ (core team). Limited commitment from
subsidiary staff due to lack of understanding of their role in the ERP implementation is
reflected in their failure to engage and organise themselves for the implementation, this
is referred to in the comment:
Live workshops intended to make them think about the way they would like to
organise themselves. We used to have a specific way of doing things and the girl
she didn’t want to change at all. The procedure is completely different in Lawson
and she didn’t want to change at all (core team).
Core team staff were aware that some problems stemmed from sending out too much
information, particularly the overwhelming nature of electronic communication. Yet
they also consistently drew attention to how subsidiary staff failed to recognise the
importance of meetings and dialogue and to failures in communicating the ERP process
to all levels of staff within the subsidiary:
At a more senior level definitely they will have had so many presentations that
they will probably have the bigger picture…. For the lower level in the finance
community - they would know their own modules but they probably won’t see the
bigger picture until the training happens or they get their hands on. But for the
other user communities, such as the engineers and the store men, this is going to
be a huge change for them and I am not convinced that they are getting the big
picture at all before it happens (core team).
Training was also consistently identified as a key problem. A core team project
member refers to how in the early stages of the implementation: ‘You’ve got six trainers

training on the one subject who have completely different training material, which is not
very helpful’. As such, training was considered poorly designed, focused on technical
issues, confined to individual business processes and failed to allow for overall
understanding of the integration of software processes. These issues resulted in a lack
of ownership by operational subsidiary staff and an associated lack of commitment and
motivation to change. This distancing from the change acted as a form of resistance.
Resistance was also generated due to the changes in job functions, control
responsibilities, and lack of understanding of how employees would benefit from the
ERP software.
The change management team: roles and activities
The change management team were tasked with the motivational aspects of the ERP
change process; although in practice the training aspects of change dominated their
activities. As one change manager commented:
I came in after the pilots; I spent three and a half months evaluating the pilots.
Learning what had worked and applying it in the next rollout….. A lot of what we
are considering today and would record as change management is still very much
focused on training (change team).
The change management team comprised a manager, communications specialists and
trainers. They performed roles as: communicators of the character and substance of the
change process, as well as being trainers, motivators and promoters. These roles
involved: building support for the ERP change process; providing guidance; and
evaluation and assessment of the success of the implementation. Despite their efforts to
produce a powerful message, project team members recognised that they had omitted to
develop an all embracing vision:
I don’t think we had a clear vision or message to end users. The message is still
very much held within the project and the management sponsors. I don’t think we
had a slogan as what this was to appear to the end user in the subsidiary’, (change
team).
Global Rollout and the Creation of a Post Deployment Team
As the global rollout proceeded in Europe and Africa, problems arising from the use of
the software in the implemented subsidiaries overwhelmed the project team and affected
their capacity to focus on further implementation. For this reason, a post deployment
team was assembled and tasked with identifying and solving user problems. They
visited the implemented subsidiaries and through on the job training, meetings and the
establishment of training workshops, accessed user problems and identified solutions.
Over this period they accumulated a set of practices which they then made available to
the subsidiaries they visited
The post deployment team was instrumental in facilitating the devolvement of ERP
software and business process development. Within each subsidiary they mobilised the
development of permanent virtual communities aimed at delivering and transmitting
best practices across the MNC. The post deployment team also identified the need to reexamine and re-structure business processes and stimulated subsidiaries in the Middle
East Region and Russia, to proactively create the new permanent role of business
process manager. Completion of the global rollout saw the replacement of the project

team and post deployment team with a centralised permanent worldwide financial
centre located in Dubai, and devolved structures located in the subsidiaries (led by
process leaders), with the capacity to inform not only future ERP software strategy but
also business process re-design.
The post deployment team (established following the experience of implementation
within Europe) performed a critical role in accessing tacit understanding of user
problems. The team comprised ten members: five of these were process leaders for the
key business processes (purchasing, legal and fiscal, sales, inventory and cash
management) and three were external consultants (two for software development and
one for project management and document control). The team was led by a senior
manager and their key remit was to spend time with subsidiary personnel discussing and
observing their needs, and identifying solutions and best practice techniques.
Interviews conducted with post deployment team members provided a critical
evaluation of both the functioning of the project team and insight into how the
organisation tackled the problems generated by such a rapid implementation process.
They soon realised that a key issues was that employees were unable to understand how
the software integrated diverse business processes:
They did not grasp the applications, because people didn't know what to do with
applications that’s because we had skipped a key thing of relating the process to
the applications. We gave them the application but we didn’t say how it fits in
with their role (post deployment team).
This problem occurred as the ERP package was a chain of applications performed by
different groups. Most users were struggling to understand their part of the software
application and were unaware of the consequences of their actions for other users.
According to the post deployment team, implementation had only focused on teaching
the employees about the software. For this reason, the team leader deliberately selected
post deployment team members who had not been involved in the initial design of the
software. As such, the post deployment team were keen not to be associated with the
project team or to be seen to be defenders of the software. In seeking to maintain this
distance they used a different logo on all their communications material. Yet despite
the team leader’s critique of the implementation process, he did concede that it would
have taken too long to access subsidiary staff by face-to-face engagement and
consultation from the beginning. The nature of the change process required subsidiary
staff to use the software in order for them to begin to understand how it worked. These
sentiments are reflected in his comment:
We go in after and solve the problem, if we don’t do that, it takes too
long…..When you look at the way the applications are employed in this company,
it’s often like that. We always succeed. There is always a six month difficult
period when we have more commitment to do what ever it takes to make it work.
If you give this project to a consultant, they would say you are crazy going that
way but in the end, it will take less time to do it this way and time is the main
thing (post deployment team).
Another key function of the post deployment team was their role in developing
permanent structures within the subsidiary to continuously improve and re-align
business processes. They were instrumental in developing the roles of subsidiary staff

responsible for each of the individual ERP software modules. These roles were
extended to include collaboration with subsidiary process leaders to improve existing
processes and share knowledge, which in turn mobilised effective problem solving
throughout the organisation. This was accomplished via the use of teleconferencing
between process leaders in regional subsidiaries once every month and in their use of an
electronic bulletin board. The practices and roles performed by the deployment team
contrasted with the Paris project team. Their efforts emphasised direct face-to-face
interaction with subsidiary staff, in an attempt to access tacit understanding of user
problems and to transmit organisational knowledge of successful solutions.
Making Things Happen: Competencies and Change Improvisation
Each team developed roles and practices which enabled improvisation of the ERP
software strategy. Internal change agents within the project team applied political,
technical and structural methods to this end. Political practices included the application
of the 80/20 rule and use of their personal networks and reputation to gain support and
access to identification of user needs. The 80/20 rule set an objective that 80% of
software requirements identified by the subsidiaries should be achieved. In this way,
software strategy could be promoted as successful without ever achieving all of its
requirements. Moreover, omission to articulate a vision for the ERP software left
interpretation of the intended software functionality open to development by the
subsidiaries. As such, production of the software became a constant process of
identifying, balancing and negotiating user needs.
Change Improvisation
The core project team and post deployment team also developed practices and
behaviours to overcome problems arising from ERP implementation. Training was
developed to include awareness workshops and e-learning. Awareness workshops were
designed to give guidelines to enable the subsidiary to organise itself. E-learning
software provided the means whereby subsidiary employees could control their own
learning. Such techniques sought to overcome the time and resource constraints of
implementation whilst also appealing to the organisational culture which prized
autonomy. The change management team also recognised the critical role of subsidiary
internal change agents:
It appears we are following the right track as we have realised we need to change
the strategy again, to identify the ‘superusers’ (subsidiary internal change agents),
before the training rather than in the training and then give them extra training. I
suppose we identified that we needed more resources earlier.
A need to engage with operational personnel was also recognised, and facilitated further
recruitment of staff with operational experience to the project core team. These new
members used their knowledge of organisational structures and culture to develop
changes in the content of training workshops, which became more practically orientated
in the use of real scenarios and operational field language. Despite this, their personal
delivery of these workshops was restricted due to the high financial cost of subsidiary
visits and the short time frame available for implementation.
Project team members also developed solutions to implementation problems by two
mechanisms, namely, intentionally designed solutions to anticipated problems and
improvised activities and procedures. The 80/20 rule, an intentionally designed solution

used in the development of the ERP software strategy was extended to the
implementation strategy, whereby training was required of 80% of staff:
The 80/20 rule is the main rationale behind all our training
decisions, and what is happening right now does address the
bulk of issues, but the remaining 20% is not going away, (core
team).
Recognition of communication problems due to the remoteness of the project team and
the complexity of the ERP process was alleviated by the institution of electronic
communication processes. Electronic ticketing software filtered and allocated the
problems identified by staff to appropriate project team members, while computer
hardware problems were attended to by a team at Gatwick. Similarly, the appointment
of subsidiary internal change agents and a centrally located help desk manned by
experts provided human intermediaries to cope with implementation problems.
Competencies for managing change
Although, a wide range of competencies were identified, particular competencies were
referred to by all respondents. These related to the long standing tenure, wide range of
experience and practical knowledge of financial and operational business process in
diverse regional locations of the MNC. Emphasis was also placed on the importance of
having practical or functional and operational knowledge. This is reflected in the
following comments:
Competency - well it’s a mixed cocktail, a little bit between business systems,
applications and development. I have also spent several years as a training
development manager in different segments (change manager).
Although knowledge, experience, awareness and sensitivity were considered important
it was the political competencies applied to handling people and driving the change
process that all respondents considered important. Examples of this included: being
economical with communication; alliance building; networking and building trust
through persuasion, negotiation, diplomacy and changing tactics. The competency of
the core team staff was seen by many as a key factor in tackling implementation
problems. Essentially, the project team comprised employees who possessed a wide
range of skills and were viewed as having a high level of competence. Not only the
core project team but also the post deployment team were seen to have a useful portfolio
of competencies for dealing with change issues. This was evidenced by their
longstanding tenure, practical user knowledge of subsidiary business processes and
detailed knowledge of the ERP software. Evidence generated from the Paris case study
reflected post deployment team abilities to access understanding of employee problems
with the ERP software. Post deployment team members remarked on the failure in the
design of the implementation strategy to relate changes in business processes to the new
application. For them the implementation had focused on teaching the employees about
the new software.
Conclusion
Processual data from the Paris case study illustrates how the change strategy evolved
over time and comprised two key elements. The first focussed around the design of the
software and analysis of current operating procedures and the second was concerned

with managing the implementation of the new system and dealing with contingencies
and unforseen events. The project core team and change management team as well as
the post deployment team consisted of a range of employees with a combination of
abilities and skills that combined to create a dynamic and effective web of roles. This
form of distributed change agency proved highly effective in dealing with a range of
social, behavioural and technical issues as they arose during software development and
implementation. These distributed roles within teams accomplished two critical
functions: firstly, they improved communication and feedback as they created channels
whereby change agents could gain deep understanding of subsidiary user problems and
then transmit back their solutions; and secondly, these teams maintained and built
support for the change process.
Temporal and contextual analysis of their roles, demonstrate how each team used
complementary methods and practices to accomplish rapid ERP change. Practices used
by the project team included: omission to articulate a change vision; use of a formal
evaluation procedure after the pilot implementation; mobilising informal networks to
build support; use of the 80/20 rule; setting a formal objective for ERP implementation
to all subsidiary staff; devolving responsibility for ERP change communication to the
subsidiaries; building subsidiary steering committees to support implementation; and
use of electronic ticketing and communications systems to support implementation.
Post deployment team methods included: a focus on face-to-face communication,
training and support of subsidiary staff; use of kick off meetings; promoting and
training subsidiary process leaders to use electronic bulletin boards to share learning;
promoting themselves as a completely different identity to the project team by use of
different logos and staff; displaying receptive behaviours in allowing subsidiary staff to
impart their problems in using the software. Subsidiary support teams acted as a bridge
or boundary spanner between the project team and subsidiary. Methods employed by
them included: close face-to-face contact with subsidiary staff to access their problems;
electronic allocation of these identified problems to the project team; visits to the
headquarters for training and to liaise with the project team; and mobilising their
informal subsidiary networks to build local support, trust and transmit knowledge of the
use of the ERP software. As such, this study usefully demonstrates how dispersed
teams of change agents facilitated improvisation of the ERP software and
implementation strategies to accomplish complex large-scale change.
In our study, we identified a central control team, an implementation team and a post
deployment trouble shooting team. Each of these teams exhibited clusters of
competencies. These competencies centred on personal qualities of being open and
approachable, tolerant of differences and being prepared to listen and assess issues in a
non-judgemental fashion. They were also based on knowledge and understanding of the
issues to be tackled which required an ability to work within a team in enabling
knowledge transmission and organisational learning. A key ability rested on managing
people and in particular, on managing the politics of change. Working in collaboration
with others from different knowledge domains and disciplines, to develop a common
language and to gain participation in decision-making – were all contributors to getting
staff involved and committed to change. In developing these ideas further, we aim to
formulate a competency framework in our next paper to inform the selection of change
team members and provide practical support for managing large-scale change in
organisations.

References
Alvesson, M. and S. Sveningsson (2008) Changing Organizational Culture: Cultural Change Work in
Progress. London: Routledge.
Andriopoulos, C. and Dawson, P. (2009) Managing Change, Creativity and Innovation. London: Sage.
Appleton, E.L., (1997), ‘How to survive ERP’ Datamation, 43 3 pp.50.
Beer, M. and Nohria, N. (1998) ‘Cracking the code of change’, Harvard Business Review, 78 3 pp.13341.
Balogun, J., Gleadle, P., Hailey, H. and Willmott, H. (2005) ‘Managing across boundaries: boundaries
shaking practices’ British Journal of Management 16 4 pp.261-278.
Buchanan, D. (2003) ‘Demands, manipulations, careers: the lived experience of driving change’ Human
Relations 56 pp.663-684.
Buchanan, D. and Badham, R. (2008), Power, Politics and Organisational Change: Winning the Turf
Game, 2nd edn. London: Sage.
Buchanan, D., Caldwell, R., Meyer, J., Storey, J., and Wainwright, C. (2007), ‘Leadership transmission a
muddled metaphor?’ Journal of Health Organization and Management 21 3 pp.246-258.
Caldwell, R. (2003) ‘Models of change agency: a fourfold classification’ British Journal of Management
14 pp.131-142.
Caldwell, R. (2005) Agency and Change, London: Routledge.
Caruso, D. (2007) ‘Six ways to ensure an ERP implementation delivers value’ Manufacturing Business
Technology 25 8 pp.27-29.
Cummings, T.G., and Worley, C.G. (1997), Organization Development and Change, 6th edn. Cincinnati:
South Western College Publishing.
Dawson, P. (1994) Organizational Change: A Processual Approach, London: Paul Chapman.
Dawson, P. (2003) Understanding Organizational Change: The Contemporary Experience of People at
Work, London: Sage.
Drucker, P. (1999) Management Challenges for the 21st Century, Oxford: Butterworth–Heinemann.
Dunphy, D. and Stace, D. (1993), ‘The strategic management of corporate change’ Human Relations 46 8
pp.905-18.
French, W.L. and Bell, C.H. (1995) Organization Development, 5th edn. Engelwood: Prentice Hall.
Galpin, T. (1996) The Human Side of Change: A Practical Guide to Organizational Redesign, San
Francisco: Jossy-Bass.
Gronn, P. (2002) ‘Distributed leadership as a unit of analysis’ Leadership Quarterly 13. pp.423-51.
Judson, A. (1991) Changing Behaviour in Organisations: Minimising Resistance to Change, Cambridge,
MA: Basil Blackwell.
Dunphy, D. and Stace, D. (1990) Under New Management: Australian Organizations in Transition,
Sydney: McGraw-Hill.
Gilley, A. (2005) The Manager as Change Leader, Westport: Praeger Publishers.
Hartley, J., Benington, J., and Binns, P. (1997) ‘Researching the roles of internal-change agents in the
management of organisational change’ British Journal of Management 8 pp.61-73.
Kanter, R, M. (1983) The Change Masters: Innovation and Entrepreneurship in the American
Corporation, New York: Simon & Schuster Inc.
Kotter, J. (1996) Leading Change. Harvard: Harvard Business School Press.
Martin, M.H. (1998) ‘An electronics firm will save big money by replacing six people with one…’
Fortune 137 2 pp.149-152.
Mayon-White, W. (1993) Problem Solving in Small Groups: Team Members as Agents of Change,
London, Paul Chapman Publishing.
Ottaway, R. N. (1983) ‘The change agent: a taxonomy in relation to the change process’ Human Relations
36 4 pp.361-92.
Pettigrew, A.M. (1985) The Awakening Giant: Continuity and Change in Imperial Chemical Industries,
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Pettigrew, A.M., (2001), Management Research after Modernism, British Journal of Management, 12
Special Issue, pp.61-70
Pettigrew, A, M., Ferlie, E., and McKee, L. (1992), Shaping Strategic Change: Making Change Happen in
Large Organisations: The Case of the National Health Service, London ,Sage.
Saka, A, (2003), Internal Change Agents View of the Management of Change Problem, Journal of
Organizational Change Management, 16(5), pp480-496
Tichy, N. (1975) ‘How different types of change agents diagnose organizations’ Human Relations 28 9
pp.771-799.
West, M.A., (1990), The Social Psychology of Innovation in Groups, in: M.A. West and J.L. Farr (eds),
Innovation and Creativity at Work, Chichester, Wiley.

